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Pennsylvania Residents Are Without Standing to
Challenge Both the Gaming Board's Grant of Casino
Licenses and the Constitutionality of Section 1204
of the Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and
Gaming Act: Society Hill Civic Association v.
Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board
PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL PROCEDURE - STANDING -
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - PENNSYLVANIA RACE HORSE
DEVELOPMENT AND GAMING ACT - The Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania denied residents' petition for review of the grant of casino
licenses for lack of standing because petitioners failed to pursue
intervention to achieve party status and were not aggrieved.
Soc'y Hill Civic Ass'n v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 928 A.2d 175
(Pa. 2007).
On February 1, 2007, the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board
(Gaming Board) granted conditional slot licenses to two casinos in
the City of Philadelphia-Foxwoods Casino (Foxwoods) and HSP
Gambling, L.P. (HSP). 1 Petitioners, four individuals and four civic
associations located in Philadelphia (collectively, Society Hill),
appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, challeng-
ing the Gaming Board's grant of the slot licenses. 2 Additionally,
Society Hill questioned the constitutionality of section 1204 of the
Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act (Gaming
Act). 3
1. Soc'y Hill Civic Ass'n v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 928 A.2d 175 (Pa. 2007). On July
5, 2004, Pennsylvania Governor Edward G. Rendell signed legislation creating the Penn-
sylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act. Bedford Downs Mgmt. Corp. v. State
Harness Racing Comm'n, 926 A.2d 908 (Pa. 2007). See Pennsylvania Race Horse Develop-
ment and Gaming Act, 4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101-1904 (West 2008). The Gaming Act
authorized a limited number of slot machine licenses to be distributed throughout the state.
Bedford, 926 A.2d 908. The Gaming Act also formed the Pennsylvania Gaming Control
Board, which determines those applicants who receive licenses, holds public hearings, and
regulates the disbursement of revenues generated by the casinos. Id.
2. Soc'y Hill, 928 A.2d at 178. Individual petitioners were Paul Neuwirth, Rita Gau-
det de Vecchis, Barbara Seiple, and Kathleen McGrann. Id. at 179 n.3. The civic associa-
tion petitioners were the Society Hill Association, Queen Village Neighbors Association,
Pennsport Civic Association, and Whitman Council, Inc. Id.
3. Id. at 183.
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HSP intervened 4 and filed an application for summary relief,
which was joined by Foxwoods and the Gaming Board, alleging
that Society Hill lacked standing5 to appeal the Gaming Board's
decision. 6 The Court directed the parties to submit briefs regard-
ing the following issues: (1) whether section 1204 of the Gaming
Act conferred on Society Hill standing to appeal the Gaming
Board's decision in contemplation of the court's recent decision in
Citizens Against Gambling Subsidiaries, Inc. v. Pennsylvania
Gaming Control Board;7 and (2) whether Society Hill had stand-
ing to challenge the constitutionality of section 1204 of the Gam-
ing Act.
8
Initially, the court noted its jurisdiction over Society Hill's ap-
peal, pursuant to section 1204 of the Gaming Act, which vested
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania with original jurisdiction to
hear any appeal, 9 decision, or other determination involving slot
machine licenses in the State. 10
Society Hill asserted sufficient standing to appeal by relying on
section 702 of the Administrative Agency Law,'" which grants a
person who has been aggrieved by an adjudication of a Common-
wealth agency the right to appeal, providing that that person has
4. Intervention is the "entry into a lawsuit by a third party who, despite not being
named a party to the action, has a personal stake in the outcome." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 840 (8th ed. 2004).
5. Standing is generally defined as "a party's right to make a legal claim or seek judi-
cial enforcement of a duty or right." Id. at 1442.
6. Soc'y Hill, 928 A.2d at 177 (finding that petitioner's reliance on taxpayer status
alone was insufficient to grant standing since this injury was the same as experienced by
the rest of society).
7. 916 A.2d 624 (Pa. 2007).
8. Soc'y Hill, 928 A.2d at 177.
9. Id. at 178-79. Section 1204 provides:
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania shall be vested with exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to consider appeals of any final order, determination or decision of
the board involving the approval, issuance, denial or conditioning of a slot ma-
chine license. Notwithstanding the provisions of 2 Pa.C.S. Ch. 7 Subch. A (re-
lating to judicial review of Commonwealth agency action) and 42 Pa.C.S. § 763
(relating to direct appeals from government agencies), the Supreme Court shall
affirm all final orders, determinations or decisions of the board involving the
approval, issuance, denial or conditioning of a slot machine license unless it
shall find that the board committed an error of law or that the order, determi-
nation or decision of the board was arbitrary and there was a capricious disre-
gard of the evidence.
4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1204 (West 2008).
10. Soc'y Hill, 928 A.2d at 177-78.
11. The Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Law, 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 702 (West
2008), provides that: "[any person aggrieved by an adjudication of a Commonwealth
agency who has a direct interest in such adjudication shall have the right to appeal there-
from to the court vested with jurisdiction of such appeals by or pursuant to Title 42 [relat-
ing to judiciary and judicial procedure]."
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a direct interest in the matter. 12 Society Hill argued that section
702 applied to all Commonwealth agencies, including the Penn-
sylvania Gaming and Control Board; moreover, due to the silence
of the Gaming Act with respect to controverting the Administra-
tive Agency Law, section 702 controlled. 13
Society Hill alleged a direct, substantial, and immediate inter-
est in the Gaming Board's decision. 14 Specifically, Society Hill
claimed the byproducts of the casinos would have lowered Society
Hill's property values. 15 Further, Society Hill alleged that the ca-
sinos would cause local businesses to fail, historic preservation
efforts to cease, and new development to be halted. 16 The civic
association petitioners asserted standing because they repre-
sented the residents, who resided near the proposed casinos' loca-
tion. 17 The civic association petitioners participated in the pro-
ceedings before the Gaming Board, where they testified regarding
negative effects that would result due to HSP and Foxwoods' casi-
nos. 18
The majority, writing per curiam, 19 began by reexamining its
recent decision in Citizens.20 In Citizens, the respondent casino
and Gaming Board intervened and filed a motion for summary
relief alleging that petitioners lacked standing. 21 In Citizens, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that petitioners lacked stand-
ing, and dismissed their petition for review, because petitioners
failed to intervene in prior proceedings. 22 Additionally, the court
did not find persuasive petitioners' argument that they had a di-
12. Soc'y Hill, 928 A.2d at 179-80.
13. Id. at 180.
14. Id. at 179.
15. Id. Such byproducts include increased noise, crime, disruptions in family life, dis-
ruptions by compulsive gamblers, suicides, and higher divorce rates. Id.
16. Id.
17. Soc'y Hill, 928 A.2d at 179.
18. Id.
19. Per curiam means the court is writing the opinion "as a whole." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1676 (8th ed. 2004).
20. Soc'y Hill, 928 A.2d at 180 (citing Citizens Against Gambling Subsidies v. Pa. Gam-
bling Control Bd., 916 A.2d 624 (Pa. 2007)). Citizens, decided just months prior, involved a
direct appeal by a Pennsylvania citizen and an organization, challenging both the grant of
the slot machine license, and the constitutionality of section 1204 of the Gaming Act. Id.
21. Id. (citing Citizens, 916 A.2d at 624 (Pa. 2007)).
22. Id. The court stated, "[w]e agree with the Board and Intervenor that permitting an
appeal based on taxpayer standing alone absent intervention in the administrative pro-
ceedings is inconsistent with orderly rules of procedure and would foster untenable imprac-
ticalities in terms of the development of an essential record for consideration on appeal."
Id.
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rect interest in the Gaming Board's decision because, inter alia,
petitioners relied solely on taxpayer status. 23
In the present matter, Society Hill argued that Citizens was dis-
tinguishable because, unlike the plaintiffs in Citizens, Society Hill
had more than mere taxpayer standing.24 Additionally, Society
Hill contended that their close proximity to the casino sites af-
forded them a more direct interest than the interest of the plain-
tiffs in Citizens.25 The Gaming Board countered by arguing the
same position that was taken previously in Citizens-that, al-
though Society Hill participated in the pre-licensure hearings,
their failure to formally object resulted in a lack of standing to
appeal.26 Additionally, the Gaming Board argued that Society
Hill erred in relying on section 702 because, under the Gaming
Board's interpretation, direct appeals of such a nature are exclu-
sively governed by section 1204.27 To support its argument, the
Gaming Board relied on the language in section 1204 of the Gam-
ing Act, which it contended expressly conflicted with and super-
ceded section 702 of the Administrative Agency Law. 28
Ultimately, the majority determined that section 702 of the
Administrative Agency Law did not apply to appeals of the Gam-
ing Board's decisions. 29 By examining the statute's construction,
the court reasoned that section 702 applied only to appeals under
Title 42.30 Society Hill based its claim on section 1204.31 Pursu-
ant to section 1204, which controlled, party status was required to
have standing to appeal. 32 Because it failed to intervene in the
initial proceedings, Society Hill did not achieve party status. 33
23. Id. at 180-81. There can generally be state taxpayer standing, but not federal. See
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
24. Soc'y Hill, 928 A.2d at 181. The majority opined, "[p]etitioners [also] maintain that
they were unaware of the intervention procedures set forth at 58 Pa. Code 441.19(y) and
that their failure to intervene was not a strategic tactic as occurred in Citizens." Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 181-82.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 182.
29. Soc'y Hill, 928 A.2d at 182.
30. Id. Title 42 deals with judicial and judicial procedure.
31. Id. at 179. The majority noted, however, that they were not adopting the Gaming
Board's argument that section 1204 of the Gaming Act superceded section 702 of the Ad-
ministrative Agency Law, but rather that section 702 did not apply because of the language
of the Act. Id. at 183 n.8.
32. Id. at 182-83.
33. Id. at 183. The court went on to reject petitioners' claim that they did not have to
satisfy the procedural requirements to make a timely intervention to quality for party
status because petitioners were unaware of it. Id.
Vol. 46
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Next, the majority examined the procedures used by the Gam-
ing Board in entertaining objections by concerned parties. 34 They
found that allowing a person to appeal, absent a prior formal ob-
jection, would be impractical and frustrate the licensing process as
a whole.
35
The court then addressed the constitutionality of section 1204 of
the Gaming Act. 36 Specifically, Society Hill alleged that section
1204 denied the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the power to review
individual agency action, which they contended violated article V,
section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 37 Society Hill was re-
quired to show that the Gaming Board's decision caused them to
be aggrieved in a way that was substantial, direct, and immedi-
ate.38 In addition, Society Hill argued that they had been ag-
grieved solely by the standard of review set forth in section 1204.
39
However, the majority did not find that the standard of review, on
its own, was enough to justify a substantial, direct, and immediate
interest. 40 Accordingly, since the court did not find Society Hill
was injured by any provision of section 1204, their interest was
not sufficient to justify standing.
41
Finding that Society Hill lacked standing to appeal both the
Gaming Board's decision and the constitutionality of section 1204
34. Soc'y Hill, 928 A.2d at 183.
35. Id. The court further explained, "[wie emphasize that the regulations promulgated
by the Board provide an adequate opportunity for a person to achieve party status through
intervention if the person has an interest in the proceeding which is substantial, direct, and
immediate and if the interest is not adequately represented in a licensing hearing." Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 184. The Pennsylvania Constitution, article V, section 2 provides:
The Supreme Court:
(a) shall be the highest court of the Commonwealth and in this court
shall be reposed the supreme judicial power of the Commonwealth;
(b) shall consist of seven justices, one of whom shall be the chief justice;
and
(c) shall have such jurisdiction as shall be provided by law.
PA. CONST. art. V, § 2.
38. Soc'y Hill, 928 A.2d at 184. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that an inter-
est is substantial "if it is an interest in the resolution of the challenge which surpasses the
common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law." Id. (citing In re Hickson,
821 A.2d 1238, 1243 (Pa. 2003)). Furthermore, "a 'direct' interest mandates a showing that
the matter complained of 'caused harm to the parties interested', id., i.e., a causal connec-
tion between the harm and the violation of law." Soc'y Hill, 928 A.2d at 184 (citing City of
Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 577 (Pa. 2003)). Finally "an interest is im-
mediate if the causal connection is not remote or speculative." Soc'y Hill, 928 A.2d at 184
(citing Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 577 (Pa. 2003)).




of the Gaming Act, the court dismissed Society Hill's petition and
granted the Gaming Board's motion for summary relief.
42
Justice Saylor wrote a dissenting opinion. 43 Justice Saylor ob-
jected to the majority's decision that section 702 of the Adminis-
trative Agency Law did not apply. 44 Under his analysis, section
702 would apply to petitioners' case because Saylor disagreed that
the language in section 1204 of the Gaming Act usurped or super-
ceded any language in section 702. 45 Accordingly, Justice Saylor
felt Society Hill was not required to have party status in order to
appeal the Gaming Board's decision. 46 Rather, Justice Saylor re-
lied on Application of El Rancho Grande, Inc.,47 in which the court
found that party status was not required under section 702 to
support an appeal of an administrative agency's decision, so long
as the petitioner had a direct interest.
48
In addition, Justice Saylor suggested that certain evidence
shown by Society Hill, especially their close proximity to the pro-
posed casinos, may have been enough to afford them a direct in-
terest in the matter. 49 At a minimum, Justice Saylor felt Society
Hill should have been entitled to a factual determination regard-
ing their level of direct interest. 50
While the origins of the standing doctrine have always been un-
clear, they seem to have originated in the common-law writ sys-
tem. 51 Where a person's cause of action was confined to a particu-
lar writ, there was no need to discuss issues of standing. 52 Gradu-
ally, however, as the writ system was abandoned, those who
wished to challenge decisions of legislative bodies were required to
42. Id. at 184-85.
43. Id. at 185 (Saylor, J., dissenting). He was joined by Justice Castille. Id.
44. Soc'y Hill, 928 A.2d at 185 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 185. Specifically, Justice Saylor stated:
Section 1204 of the Gaming Act, which invests this Court with original and ex-
clusive appellate jurisdiction relative to appeals pertaining to the issuance of
gaming licenses, supplants only the contrary portion of Section 702 which pro-
vides for appeals to the court having jurisdiction pursuant to the Judicial Code,
42 Pa.C.S. Title 42. See 4 Pa.C.S. § 1204.
Id.
46. Id. at 186.
47. 437 A.2d 1150 (Pa. 1981) (holding that petitioners had standing to challenge the
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board's grant of a liquor license to a competitor by alleging a
direct interest in the matter which was both substantial and particular to petitioners
alone).
48. Soc'y Hill, 928 A.2d at 186 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 55 (1978).
52. Id.
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show that their personal interests were "directly and specially af-
fected."5 3  Under modern American legal practice, standing
emerges, theoretically, from Article III of the United States Con-
stitution, which restricts federal judicial power to "cases" and
"controversies." 54
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court attempted to define
the standing doctrine in Fast v. Cohen.55 In Flast, the Court
granted standing56 to petitioners to challenge the Government's
funding of certain parochial schools, based solely on petitioners'
status as taxpayers. 57 By 1970, the United States Supreme Court,
in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp,58 reformulated standing, settling decades of vagueness
among the circuits. 59 The Court addressed whether petitioners, a
group of data processing companies, had standing to challenge a
ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency, which they alleged
would detrimentally affect their economic interests. 60 Ultimately,
Data Processing adopted a two-part requirement known as the
"injury-in-fact" test. 61 First, the plaintiff must assert an injury-in-
fact, which is economic or otherwise. 62 Second, the plaintiff must
show that his injury was within the zone of interests sought to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
in question.63 Ultimately, the Court granted standing to petition-
53. Id.
54. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). See also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
55. 392 U.S. 83. In F/ast, petitioner argued that certain expenditures of federal funds
made under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to parochial schools were
in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.
Flast, 392 U.S. at 83.
56. Flast, 392 U.S. at 99. The United States Supreme Court stated:
The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to
get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have
adjudicated. The "gist of the question of standing" is whether the party seeking
relief has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues."
Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
57. F/ast, 392 U.S. 83.
58. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
59. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 150.
60. Id. at 152. Petitioners specifically alleged that the ruling by the Comptroller of the
Currency would allow national banks to make data processing services (in addition to their
normal banking services) available to other banks and bank customers. Petitioners
claimed that the increased data processing competition would result in a loss of profits. Id.
61. Id. at 152-53.
62. Id. at 152.
63. Id. at 153.
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ers after a showing that their loss of business due to the Comptrol-
ler's action constituted an economic injury-in-fact.64
In Pennsylvania, the supreme court has adopted a doctrine of
standing65 which differs slightly from the federal version. 66 Com-
pared to the more rigid federal requirements, modern decisions by
the court have described Pennsylvania's standing requirements as
flexible. 67 In the 1970s, after the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
sat dormant for many years on the issue, the court decided Wil-
liam Penn Parking Garage v. City of Pittsburgh,68 in which it lib-
erally expanded the class of interests from which an "aggrieved"69
person could claim standing. 70 In William Penn, several parking
lot operators, as well as fifty individual taxpayers, challenged a
tax passed by the City of Pittsburgh, imposing a twenty-percent
tax on all non-residential parking places. 71 The court established
a two-part test in order for a plaintiff to have standing. 72 First,
the plaintiff must allege an interest which is substantial and di-
rect. 73 Second, the plaintiff must illustrate a causal connection
64. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152.
65. See In re Application of Family Style Restaurant, Inc., 468 A.2d 1088 (Pa. 1983); In
re Application of El Rancho Grande, Inc., 437 A.2d 1150 (Pa. 1981); William Penn Parking
Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269 (Pa. 1975).
66. In Erfer v. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325 (Pa. 2002), the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania explained:
The U.S. Supreme Court has unequivocally declared that "state courts are not
bound to adhere to federal standing requirements .... " (ASARCO Inc. v.
Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989). The high Court recognized that in resolving is-
sues of standing, state courts are not constrained by the dictates of Article III
of the United States Constitution.
Erfer, 794 A.2d at 329.
67. In re Hickson, 821 A.2d 1238, 1243 (Pa. 2003). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
stated: "[olur Commonwealth's standing doctrine is not a senseless restriction on the utili-
zation of judicial resources; rather, it is a prudential, judicially-created tool meant to win-
now out those matters in which the litigants have no direct interest in pursuing the mat-
ter." Hickson, 821 A.2d at 1243.
68. 346 A.2d 269 (Pa. 1975).
69. William Penn, 346 A.2d at 280. Traditionally, the word "aggrieved" had been de-
fined in Pennsylvania by the case of Lansdowne Board of Adjustments Appeal, 170 A. 867
(Pa. 1934), requiring a person to not only have a direct interest in the matter challenged,
but also possess an interest which is immediate and pecuniary. Lansdowne, 170 A. at 868.
70. William Penn, 346 A.2d 269.
71. Id. at 275. This tax was popularly known as the 'Tax Anything Act" due to the
Act's broad grant of discretion to levy taxes. Id. at 275 n.1.
72. Id. at 281-83.
73. Id. at 282. The court stated:
The requirement of a "substantial" interest simply means that the individual's
interest must have substance-there must be some discernible adverse effect to
some interest other than the abstract interest of all citizens in having others
comply with the law .... The requirement that an interest be "direct" simply
means that the person claiming to be aggrieved must show causation of the
harm to his interest by the matter of which he complains.
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between the injury and the judgment being challenged, that is
immediate, and not a remote consequence of the judgment.74 In
addition, William Penn added the requirement of an injury to a
"pecuniary" interest, although it expressly refused to establish a
threshold amount. 75
In 1979, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Application
of Biester,76 in which it recognized a limited exception to the two-
part standing test articulated in William Penn, allowing taxpayer
status as grounds for standing where a person has been aggrieved,
but their interests do not otherwise satisfy the traditional re-
quirements. 77 In Biester, the court examined whether an individ-
ual who filed an application to intervene based on taxpayer status
alone had standing to challenge the Act. 78 The court, while ulti-
mately denying petitioner's application, stated that in recognition
of certain policy considerations, standing based on taxpayer status
alone could be granted where certain governmental actions would
otherwise go unchallenged, or where judicial review would not
otherwise occur.79 Subsequent case law established five specific
requirements as prerequisites to establishing standing under the
Biester-taxpayer exception.80
With the passage of several amendments to the Administrative
Agency Laws and Local Agency Laws in 1978, several cases arose
in which the parties alleged standing, not on the basis of the tradi-
tional common-law formulations alone, but pursuant to the statu-
Id.
74. Id. at 283. "As in the case of 'substantial' and 'pecuniary,' these two requirements
reflect a single concern. Here that concern is with the nature of the causal connection
between the action complained of and the injury to the person challenging it." Id.
75. William Penn, 346 A.2d at 281-82. The "pecuniary interest" requirement has been
subsequently abandoned in Pennsylvania. See Viechec v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 676 A.2d
1317 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996); Appeal of Hanover, 608 A.2d 607 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992); In
re Francis Edward McGillick Found., 594 A.2d 322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
76. 409 A.2d 848 (Pa. 1979).
77. Biester, 409 A.2d at 852.
78. Id. at 850.
79. Id. at 852.
80. In Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v. Commonwealth, 888 A.2d 655 (Pa. 2005), the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania summarized the five requirements:
(1) the governmental action would otherwise go unchallenged; (2) those directly
and immediately affected by the complained of matter are beneficially affected
and not inclined to challenge the action; (3) judicial relief is appropriate; (4) re-
dress through other channels is unavailable; and (5) no other persons are bet-
ter situated to assert the claim.
Pittsburgh Palisades, 888 A.2d at 662 (citing Consumer Party of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 508
A.2d 323, 329 (Pa. 1985)).
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tory Administrative Agency or Local Agency Laws. 81 Under these
laws, any person aggrieved by an adjudication of a Common-
wealth8 2 or local agency83 has standing to appeal therefrom, pro-
vided that they also have a direct interest in the matter.
8 4
In Application of El Rancho Grande, Inc., the court examined
whether a petitioner, who conceded the inability to appeal in the
court of common pleas under the Liquor Code, would nonetheless
have standing under section 702 of the Administrative Agency
Law. 85 The court found that, although the Liquor Code prohibited
petitioners' appeal, petitioners illustrated an injury which was
substantial, direct, and unique. 86 As a result, petitioners had
statutory standing, regardless of the restrictive language of the
Liquor Code.8 7 Also, in Application of El Rancho Grande, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected another requirement of fed-
eral standing law previously established in Data Processing, hold-
ing that a person had standing to appeal even if he did not belong
to the limited class of persons identified by the law in question.88
In Application of Family Style Restaurant, Inc.,89 the court ad-
dressed standing in the context of future economic injury.90 Rely-
ing heavily on Application of El Rancho Grande, Inc., the court
determined that petitioners were not "aggrieved" within the mean-
ing of Administrative Agency Law or Pennsylvania case law by
alleging future injuries, which petitioners could not prove. 91
81. See Citizens Against Gambling Subsidies, Inc. v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 916 A.2d
624 (Pa. 2007); Maritime Mgmt. Inc. v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 611 A.2d 202 (Pa. 1992); In
re Application of Family Style, 468 A.2d 1088 (Pa. 1983); Application of El Rancho Grande,
Inc., 437 A.2d 1150 (Pa. 1981).
82. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 702 (West 2008).
83. Id. § 752.
84. Id. § 702.
85. El Rancho Grande, 437 A.2d at 1152.
86. Id. at 1153.
87. Id. at 1151. Section 464 of the Liquor Code provides in pertinent part:
Any applicant who has appeared at any hearing, as above provided, who is ag-
grieved by the refusal of the board to issue any such license or to renew or
transfer any such license may appeal, or any church, hospital, charitable insti-
tution, school or public playground located within three hundred feet of the
premises applied for, aggrieved by the action of the board in granting the issu-
ance of any such license or the transfer of any such license, may take an appeal
limited to the question of such grievance, within twenty days from date of re-
fusal or grant ....
47 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4-464 (West Supp. 2008).
88. El Rancho Grande, 437 A.2d 1150, appeal after remand, 467 A.2d 857 (Pa. 1988).
89. 468 A.2d 1088 (Pa. 1983).
90. Family Style, 468 A.2d at 1088-90.
91. Id. at 1090-91.
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In Pennsylvania Game Commission v. Department of Environ-
mental Resources,92 the court addressed whether the Game Com-
mission, a Commonwealth agency, had standing to challenge a
decision of a sister agency 93 under the authority of the Game and
Wildlife Code. 94 The court reiterated that only those who are ad-
versely affected by an agency's action and who possess a direct
interest in the matter have standing. 95 The majority found that
the Commission's interest was so great that it sufficiently
achieved standing. 96 Yet, the court stated that the particular lan-
guage of the statute granted the Commission standing; thus the
Commission could allege standing under existing case law or the
specific statute.
97
In the context of Pennsylvania casino gaming, there have been
several challenges involving standing. 98 In a case decided just
months prior to Society Hill, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
examined whether an individual's status as both a taxpayer and a
property owner gave him standing to challenge the Pennsylvania
Gaming Control Board's grant of a particular casino license. 99
Citizens v. Pennsylvania Gaming Board, which was significantly
relied upon in Society Hill, dealt with standing under the Admin-
istrative Agency Law, rather than under traditional formula-
tions. 100 In Citizens, when denying the petitioner standing based
on taxpayer status, the court stated that the "direct" requirement
under the Administrative Agency Law, while not technically the
same as traditional standing requirements, retained the notion
that a petitioner's interest must be one that is unique from the
interest common to society as whole. 101
92. 555 A.2d 812 (Pa. 1989).
93. Game Corm'n, 555 A.2d at 813. The Pennsylvania Game Commission sued the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources. Id.
94. Id. at 816.
95. Id. at 815.
96. Id. at 816.
97. Id. Although several courts held that since the Administrative Agency Laws re-
quire only a "direct" interest in the adjudication, the appellant need not also have an inter-
est that is immediate and substantial. See Pa. Auto. Ass'n v. State Bd. of Vehicle Mfrs.,
Dealers and Salespersons, 550 A.2d 1041 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988); Beers v. Commw. Unem-
ployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 546 A.2d 1260 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).
98. See Citizens Against Gambling Subsidies, Inc. v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 916 A.2d
624 (Pa. 2007); Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC. v. Commonwealth, 888 A.2d 655 (Pa.
2005); Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877
A.2d 383 (Pa. 2005).
99. Citizens, 916 A.2d 624.
100. Id. at 625-26.
101. Id. at 628.
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The Pennsylvania Gaming Act created a limited number of slot
licenses but attracted numerous applicants.10 2 Not only did the
Act invite competition among potential casino companies, but it
also fostered a breeding ground for challenges and appeals from
discontented citizens and civic groups. Pennsylvania courts have
answered issues of standing, as the courts attempt to distinguish
those who have been genuinely aggrieved from those seeking to
assert political or social interests. Facially a straight-forward is-
sue, standing has frustrated both courts and litigants for dec-
ades.103 Consequently, the seemingly polar views adopted by the
majority and Justice Saylor in Society Hill should not be surpris-
ing, considering the inconsistent evolution of both the federal and
Pennsylvania standing requirements.
In an ideal system, when courts made decisions regarding
standing, their determination would have no relation to the sub-
stantive merits of the plaintiffs underlying allegations. Unfortu-
nately, the ideal judicial system, free from any and all political
influences, does not exist in the practical world. As the gatekeep-
ers to the judicial system, judges govern their own province,
through determinations of standing-deciding who should be al-
lowed access to challenge which laws. Accordingly, it would not be
a significant breakthrough to question whether politics influences
judges when standing matters are raised.
Modern standing law appears to find itself closer to being a part
of the political system than a part of the legal system. 10 4 The
highly politicized nature of casino gaming in Pennsylvania raises
the question of whether the majority in Society Hill was influ-
enced by politics or law. People will inevitably wonder if there
was more to this decision than just black letter law. Many in the
public realm question whether judges have been influenced by
ulterior motives-from local level courts, to the United States Su-
preme Court. 0 5 The relevancy of this question is further compli-
cated when one considers that the doctrine of standing in Penn-
sylvania is almost entirely created by the judiciary, contrasted
with federal standing requirements which find their roots in the
102. Robert P. Krauss, Pennsylvania Bar Institute Gaming Law Update, PA. B. INST. 1
(2006).
103. Kevin A. Coyle, Standing of Third Parties to Challenge Administrative Agency
Actions, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1061 (1988).
104. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1787
(1999).
105. Id. at 1741.
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United States Constitution. 1 0 6 The politically charged atmosphere
in Pennsylvania, combined with the capricious history of standing,
legitimizes the question.
In its analysis, the majority expressed a concern about the
"time-sensitive nature" of implementing the Gaming Act. 107
While efficiency in government is never undesirable, the court
should not have been so preoccupied with efficiency as to deny
court access to those who have a genuine interest in the outcome.
The petitioners, here, resided within a few hundred feet of the
proposed casinos-if they lacked standing, it is difficult to imagine
who would have it. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, in a
thoughtful yet provocative article, argued that courts should cre-
ate a doctrine of standing that remains true to the original inten-
tion of the court system-to provide access to those seeking to pro-
tect minority, rather than majority, interests. 
108
Ultimately, the decision in Society Hill is a significant one. Fol-
lowing the court's holding, to have been successful in their appeal,
petitioners were required not only to have participated in the pro-
ceedings before the Gaming Board, but also to have filed a formal
complaint prior to the Gaming Board's licensing grant. 109 Because
the pertinent section of the Pennsylvania Administrative Agency
law did not apply, party status would have been required to sus-
tain a subsequent appeal. 110
The practical effects of the decision were revealed just days af-
ter the decision was rendered. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
relied upon Society Hill in denying several petitions for review of
other related Gaming Board decisions.11' In the future, this case
will likely prevent appeals by private citizens and civic groups,
effectively ending all Gaming Act-related challenges in
106. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
107. Soc'y Hill, 928 A.2d at 183.
108. Antonin J. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separa-
tion of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 895 (1983).
109. Soc'y Hill, 928 A.2d at 183.
110. Id. at 182.
111. See Neighbors Allied for Best Riverfront v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 927 A.2d 199
(Pa. 2007) (petition denied); City Council for City of Philadelphia v. Pa. Gaming Control
Bd., 927 A.2d 199 (Pa. 2007) (petition denied); Heiko v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 927 A.2d
200 (Pa. 2007) (petition denied).
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Pennsylvania. The liberalization of standing requirements in
Pennsylvania that began in the 1970s was constricted by the court
in Society Hill-perhaps for motives as yet undeveloped.
Logan Scott Fisher
